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Abstract

In the long tradition of literary studies, metaphor has continually resurfaced as
the trademark of poets and rhetoricians, an indicator of sophisticated and complex
language. In contrast to the traditional wisdom of metaphor, contemporary linguists
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggest that metaphor is more than just a figure of
speech or a rhetorical tool. According to Lakoff and Johnson, humans have a
conceptual system that is largely – and fundamentally – structured by metaphor.
Lakoff and Johnson refer to these metaphors as conceptual metaphors, and they are a
fundamental part of common, everyday language.
This thesis will endeavor to explore the conceptual metaphors expressed in
children’s literature using Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical framework. I will begin
with a detailed discussion of what conceptual metaphors are, how to identify them,
and the important points of distinction between Lakoff and Johnson’s theory and the
tradition of literary metaphor. I will also review the established findings that facilitate
metaphor comprehension in children and offer justification for my chosen medium. I
will conclude with an analysis of my selected literature and discussion of the results.
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Overview & personal connection
As a live-in nanny to two preschool girls for two years, I spent a lot of time
reading children’s books. Books would capture their attention for hours. “Again!
Again!” they would plead, reluctant to let a favorite story slip out of my hands. When
one book became boring, they would reach for another, until every colorful,
hardbound volume in sight had been opened, thoroughly exhausted, and returned to
its resting place on the carpeted living room floor. Eventually, when a particularly
enthralling book had been read enough times, one of them would plop down into my
lap, carefully lay open the first page, and “read” the entire thing from memory, word
for word.
A year after my nanny experience, I took a University linguistics class on
poetics. A large chunk of our syllabus focused on metaphor. In high school, I learned
that “metaphor” was a figure of speech in which one thing was used to describe a
different thing. When used purposely, metaphor could embellish or add creative flair
to speech or writing, especially poetry. I was taught that using metaphor was a sign of
complex and sophisticated language – something to aspire to as a young budding
writer.
Four years later in my poetics class, I learned a little more about metaphor.
Guided by the text Metaphors We Live By by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, my
class explored metaphor not only as a figure of speech, but as a figure of thought.
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Lakoff and Johnson proposed that metaphor exists not only in the way we talk and
write, but in the way we think and gather information about the world around us
(Lakoff and Johnson, hereafter L&J, 3). As a consequence, much of the every-day,
colloquial language we use to express our thoughts is also metaphorical, whether we
can consciously acknowledge those metaphors or not.
I was elated to discover that I no longer had to labor over creating metaphor
for my written school work: it was already there, in the way I spoke, in the way I wrote.
And I didn’t even have to think about it. Metaphor is pervasive in our language, right
down to the simplest children’s storybook – the same books I shared with those lovely
little girls throughout the two years before.
This thesis will endeavor to explore the conceptual metaphors expressed in
children’s literature using Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical framework. I will begin
with a detailed discussion of what conceptual metaphors are, how to identify them,
and the important points of distinction between Lakoff and Johnson’s theory and the
tradition of literary metaphor. I will also review the established findings that facilitate
metaphor comprehension in children and offer justification for my chosen medium. I
will conclude with an analysis of my selected literature and discussion of the results.

Theoretical basis
For the last two thousand-or-so years, metaphor has been touted as the
brandishing iron of poets and rhetoricians, a tool used to impress, enchant,
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manipulate, and persuade their audiences. Metaphor has traditionally been viewed as
a figure of speech, an embellishment that can be added or removed from text as the
author sees fit to suit his purposes. Young writers are taught to incorporate metaphor
as a way to make their texts more sophisticated, more intellectually compelling, or
more “colorful.”
In contrast with this long literary tradition of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson
suggest that metaphor is more than just a figure of speech or a rhetorical tool.
According to Lakoff and Johnson, humans have a conceptual system that is largely –
and fundamentally – structured by metaphor (L&J 3). We depend on metaphor to at
least partially structure our thoughts and present them in an understandable manner.
Very generally, a metaphor is the expression of describing one thing (or target
domain) in terms of a different thing (or source domain) (L&J 5, Cameron Discourse
51). Metaphors are easiest to identify when they utilize fancy or elaborate language,
such as those found in poetry or other rhetorical texts. Consider, for example, the first
stanza of Christina Rossetti’s poem “A Birthday”:
My heart is like a singing bird
Whose nest is in a water'd shoot;
My heart is like an apple-tree
Whose boughs are bent with thick-set fruit;
My heart is like a rainbow shell
That paddles in a halcyon sea;
My heart is gladder than all these,
Because my love is come to me.
The author uses the features of a song bird, an apple-tree, and a rainbow shell to
describe the condition of her heart, and she elaborates the specific qualities she wants
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her audience to acknowledge. This is often the context in which students learn to
identify and develop metaphor. What are harder to identify, however, are the normal,
even boring conceptual metaphors that govern our every-day interaction with one
another. Consider, for example, the following list of statements from Lakoff and
Johnson’s book (emphasis removed):
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.
For most of us, these are normal, every-day statements we use to refer to and talk
about arguments. Nothing is particularly striking or poetic. Now consider the list
again, this time with specific words or phrases emphasized:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.
The words “indefensible,” “attacked every weak point,” “right on target,”
“demolished,” “won,” “shoot,” “strategy,” “wipe you out,” and “shot down” are all
normal ways of talking about an argument. However, the meanings of these words are
experienced elsewhere. The experience of being “indefensible,” “demolished,” “shot
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down,” etc., happens during war. Our normal, everyday language depends on what
we know of war to shape how we think, act, and talk about arguments (L&J 5). The
conceptual metaphor at work here, though not explicitly stated, is ARGUMENT IS WAR.
We are defining the first domain, ARGUMENT, in terms of the second domain, WAR.
In English, we depend on this structure to understand what we mean when we talk
about and carry out the concept “argument.”
When studying conceptual metaphor, it is important to distinguish between
the stated metaphor and the metaphoric expressions that derive from it. Metaphoric
expressions are taken directly from written or spoken text. They are the actual words
being used to express our thoughts. The underlying logic that allows a speaker to
comprehend what is being said is the conceptual metaphor itself. To help distinguish
between the two, a stated conceptual metaphor is always presented in all capital
letters throughout this thesis. To demonstrate this difference, consider again the
statements listed above regarding argument. These are metaphorical expressions
used by English speakers to talk about argument. These expressions make sense
because they derive from a conceptual framework that tells us ARGUMENT IS WAR.
It is important to acknowledge that when metaphors occur, the first domain is
only partially structured by the second domain. If the first domain is structured
entirely by the second domain, it would actually become the second domain (L&J 13).
In the ARUGMENT IS WAR example, we typically wouldn’t hear a statement like “we
marched for days over that point.” Though “marching” is a common enough
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experience in war, it is not a characteristic that usually carries over to how we
commonly structure the concept “argument.”
Of the two domains involved in a metaphor, the first domain is often the more
abstract, while the second one is more tangible or grounded in personal experience.
Abstract concepts like “argument,” “love,” or “time” often have little basis for tangible
experience; we can’t touch, see, or physically feel them. By describing or “mapping”
those concepts onto the characteristics of a less abstract concept, they become
tangible. We can talk about them and think about them more easily, because they
have been structured in a way that is more grounded in personal experience (Pramling
& Samuelsson, hereafter P&S, 708). The personal experience that allows us to make
the connections between the first domain and the second domain is called the
“experiential bases” (L&J 19). All types of metaphors have some kind of experiential
basis – they are all formed based on the way we interact with the world around us.
However, it is not always possible to pinpoint or identify exactly what that experiential
basis is (L&J 19).
Another important facet of experiential basis is that it is “built into the
conceptual system of the culture in which you live”, because “every experience takes
place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions” (L&J 57). In other words,
“we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our culture is already present in the very
experience itself” (L&J 57). As a consequence, metaphors can only be fully
comprehended within the culture they emerge from. While some metaphors may be
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similar from culture to culture and language to language, we cannot expect that
metaphors will be universally understood or acknowledged.

Identifying conceptual metaphor
One specific challenge to discussing conceptual metaphors is identifying them.
As discussed above, conceptual metaphors are a part of our normal, every-day thought
processes and subsequent language production. As a result, the language producer is
often unaware that they are even utilizing metaphor. Pramling and Samuelsson
explain:
“[over time] figurative expressions tend to become conventionalized or
institutionalized, and hence cease to be perceived as figurative by
speakers (Pramling, 2006). This means that for an experienced speaker
it may be difficult to see the figurativeness of one’s own language; it is
simply ‘how we say.’ (713)
Going back to the expressions for the ARGUMENT IS WAR example, no one statement
explicitly makes the connection between “argument” and “war.” What we observe are
only metaphoric expressions of the metaphor, not the metaphor itself. This means
that conceptual metaphors must be inferred from the statements or expressions that
derive from them, rather than be explicitly stated.
Another factor that affects metaphor identification – whether conceptual or
traditional – is what Cameron refers to as “graded conditions”. Graded conditions
refer to a metaphor’s “familiarity to the users, their conceptual complexity, their
conventionality of use within the speech community (idiomaticity), and their
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systematicity within and across discourse events” (Discourse 53). For example,
metaphors that are marked with explicit identifiers such as “like,” “such as,” or “similar
to” are more easily identified than those that are unmarked. In addition, metaphors
that appear in nominal form, such as “the river is a snake,” are more easily identified
than those that take on other forms.
As discussed above, text derived from conceptual metaphors is usually implicit
and deeply embedded in linguistic expression, which can make them more difficult to
identify. Here is an example of a metaphor that moves from linguistically explicit to
linguistically implicit:
The river is like a snake, slithering through the trees.
The river is a snake, slithering through the trees.
The river slithers through the trees.
In the first sentence, the metaphor is explicit, and the relationship between “snake”
and “river” is made clear by the marker “like.” In the second sentence, the metaphor
is still explicit, but the connection between “river” and “snake” is implied. In the third
sentence, the metaphor is not explicitly stated; the reader must infer what domain
allows “river” to be characterized by the verb “slithers,” which, in this case, is “snake.”
To assist with the identification issue, Lakoff and Johnson pinpoint three
specific types of metaphors that are widely encountered in colloquial language:
structural metaphors, orientational metaphors, and ontological metaphors. I will

Beyer 9

provide a brief description of each, followed by some examples offered by Lakoff and
Johnson.
Structural metaphors: Structural metaphors are the most “stereotypical”
metaphors, where one concept structures how we understand another concept.
Some examples:


TIME IS MONEY – “I spent three hours at the bank this morning.”



ARUGMENT IS WAR – “He’s losing this argument.”



THE MIND IS A MACHINE – “I can’t turn my mind off.”

Orientational metaphors: Orientational metaphors describe spatial orientation,
such as up-down, in-out, front-back, etc (L&J 14). The first domain is a concept; the
second domain is the orientation it receives. Examples:


HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN – “My spirits rose.”



CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN – “Wake up.” “He fell
asleep.”



HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN – “He
dropped dead.”



HAVING CONTROL/FORCE ARE UP; BEING SUBJECT TO
CONTROLL/FORCE IS DOWN – “He’s under my control.”



MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN – “My income rose last year.”



HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN – “She’s at the peak of
her career.”
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GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN – “He does high-quality work.”



VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN – “He has high standards.”



RATIONAL IS UP; EMOTIONAL IS DOWN – “He has high intellectual
capabilities.”

Ontological metaphors: Ontological metaphors impose artificial boundaries on
physical phenomena; they allow us to devise “ways of viewing events, activities,
emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances” (L&J 25). These metaphors allow us
to refer to, quantify, and identify aspects or causes of concepts that can’t otherwise be
quantified, referred to, etc. They also allow us to talk about concepts as motivating
actions and setting goals (L&J 27). Identifying these are tricky, because “merely
viewing a nonphysical thing as an entity or substance does not allow us to
comprehend very much about it” (L&J 27). A sub-category of ontological metaphors is
container metaphors, where we impose physical barriers on otherwise boundless
concepts (L&J 29). Some examples of container metaphors:


VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS – “He’s out of sight now.”



ACTIVITIES ARE CONTAINERS – “I ran in a marathon last month.”

Another kind of ontological metaphor is personification. Personification “allows us to
comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human
motivations, characteristics, and activities” (L&J 33). One example:


INFLATION IS AN ADVERSARY – “Inflation has robbed me of my
savings.”
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Differences in literary and conceptual theory
The primary distinction between Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual
metaphor and the tradition of literary metaphor in poetic or persuasive language is a
matter of conventionalization. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphor exists as a
conventional part of language, which must then rely on the conventionalization of
those same metaphors in the human conceptual system (Lakoff 223, also see P&S
713). Lakoff and Johnson’s theory emerges from an analysis of colloquial language,
and the conventional metaphors from which it derives.
Alternatively, not all metaphor is conventionalized. New metaphors are
developed all the time, often for rhetorical, poetical, or persuasive purposes. The
metaphors are constructed consciously with specific attention and effort (Lakoff 223).
As a consequence, “the most strikingly novel metaphors may slow down processing by
requiring active and conscious deliberation of their meaning” (Cameron Science 674).
These “new” or “fresh” metaphors have largely been the focus of traditional
metaphoric study, rather than the conventional metaphors Lakoff and Johnson
espouse.
One possible reason for the lack of interest in conventional metaphors is that
they are rhetorically unimpressive. They are not particularly creative; they don’t
cultivate a fresh perspective; they do not help elaborate a point in a particularly
compelling manner. By nature of conventionalization, they have become common,
routine, and boring. When Lakoff and Johnson proposed that metaphor might offer a
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glimpse into the human conceptual system, however, “research effort has been
expanded on extracting and analyzing the cognitive content of metaphor as the carrier
of socio-culturally constructed representations” (Cameron Discourse 49).

Purpose for study
This thesis will focus specifically on how conceptual metaphors present
themselves in colloquial language using the medium of children’s preschool narrative
picture books. Demonstrating the presence and purpose of conceptual metaphors in
children’s books will highlight Lakoff and Johnson’s theory that metaphors are an
essential part of language. If Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is accurate, I expect to
observe the following within my selected children’s books:
-

The language used conveys underlying “conceptual metaphors”

-

The conceptual metaphors are represented using conventional, every-day
language; they are not linguistically complex or conceptually abstract

-

The conceptual metaphors present in children’s books are already assumed
to be understood by children – they are not merely for decorative,
rhetorical, or poetic effect.

I will demonstrate these points by reading and recording instances of metaphor within
my selected literature, with the intent to distinguish between those that are literary
and those that are conventional/conceptual. Important factors I will make note of
include:
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-

What kinds of metaphor occur most often? Do they use the same
expressions, or is one metaphor elaborated using many different kinds of
expressions?

-

Is there contextual support? Is the metaphor elaborated within the text or
“demonstrated” using pictures?

My decision to observe metaphor in children’s books serves several purposes.
First, I enjoy children’s books. My experience as a nanny led to countless hours delving
into classic and popular children’s books. While I thoroughly enjoyed most of what I
read, I enjoyed the girls’ reactions even more. They loved books. They were
enthralled with them. I loved how the books calmed and focused them, so all their
energy was tied up in listening and watching the colorful pages.
Secondly, children’s books provide a wide variety of easily-accessible material
to analyze. I can collect and record data as necessary, without securing the necessary
permissions/funding needed to observe live interaction among children and/or adults.
Thirdly, children’s books – for the most part – use simple, every-day language.
Because the purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate how conceptual metaphor
presents itself in colloquial language, children’s books are ideal.
Another important feature of children’s books is illustrations. Epstein and
Gamble established in their study that pictures have superiority over words when
children attempt to establish metaphoric connections between domains (188). It
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follows that pictures may provide important contextual information that can assist
children with metaphoric comprehension.
On the other hand, children’s books have their limitations. One of the most
fascinating parts of conceptual metaphors to me personally is their flexibility – they
can be developed organically and spontaneously, even subconsciously on the part of
the speaker. While children’s books may retain the subconscious aspect of the
conceptual metaphors they portray, there is nothing organic or spontaneous about
literature (see P&S for a similar study using a video recording of preschool children).
Peripherally, I propose that children’s books may also aid in the
conventionalization that is at the heart of a metaphoric conceptual system. I would
offer that children’s books are certainly among the “everyday ‘little’ or ordinary
situations” that many children experience, and therefore they can facilitate the
conventionalization of metaphor and other kinds of figurative speech (See also Ortony,
Turner, and Larson-Shapiro, and Cameron Science 675).

Metaphor and children
At some point or another, a metaphoric conceptual system must be developed.
Given Lakoff and Johnson’s premise of a metaphor, Pramling and Samuelsson suggest:
it is in the everyday ‘little’ or ordinary situations and speech that
metaphors work and that we use and learn how to use language and
what we mean with ways of speaking—what people to a large extent
master without necessarily knowing that they do so. (P&S 709)
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This process begins at a very young age, and as a result, a number of studies analyzing
the connections between children, metaphor, and learning have cropped up in recent
years. There is a general consensus that metaphoric competence is acquired “through
participating in social practices and communication with others”, and “the child will
eventually come to ‘take over’ the tools [such as metaphor] and become able to use
them by herself” (P&S 710).
Though this process occurs subconsciously, metaphoric competence is aided by
a few concrete factors. One of those factors is age. Many recent studies suggest that
metaphoric competence starts at an early age, as early as three to four years old
(Vosniadou et al 1594, Epstein and Gamlin 170). As a child grows and experiences
more of the world, their metaphoric competence improves, continually developing
into adolescence and early adulthood (Cameron Discourse 58, Johnson Development
470, Ortonty et al Influences 31, Siltanen 15).
In addition to age, a few specific factors have been shown to aid children as
they try to make sense of metaphoric connections. Metaphoric expressions with
explicit connections between domains (such as statements with the word “like”) are
easier to understand than expressions with implicit connections (Reynolds and Ortony
1117, Epstein and Gamlin 189). Additionally, repetition and exposure to figurative
language helps improve metaphoric competence (Reynolds and Ortony 1117, Ortony
et al Influences 32), as does explicit knowledge of both the source domain and the
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target domain (Cameron Science 676 and 677, Reynolds and Ortony 1112, Epstein and
Gamlin 188).
Finally, another important tool to increasing metaphoric competence is context
(Reynolds and Ortony 1111, Vosniadou et al 1595). Cameron asserts: “Capacity with
metaphor as a linguistic and cognitive phenomenon depends on existing domain
knowledge and on ability to make use of the support offered by the discourse context”
(Discourse 61). When appropriate context supports the metaphor being developed,
children are much more likely to understand the intended metaphoric connection than
if the metaphor is presented in isolation.
Most of the studies I have read deal with children’s interpretation of literary
metaphor, rather than Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor. One feature of
conceptual metaphor is that it is used subconsciously, without specific attention to the
relationship between the domains in the metaphor being expressed. As a
consequence, children (or any language speaker, for that matter) may not have a
thorough knowledge of the domains in a conceptual metaphor, and there might not be
any supporting contextual material. However, children may still learn to utilize the
language built around it. For example, the statement “you’re in trouble” rests on the
conceptual metaphor that TROUBLE IS A CONTAINER, but it’s unlikely we would find a
child who doesn’t understand the consequences of such a statement, even if they
can’t explicitly make the connection between TROUBLE and CONTAINER. This
hypothesis is supported by Ortony et al: given an appropriate amount of exposure to
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the figurative language “with a view to inculcating an understanding of their nature
and effects” (29), a child (or person) need not fully experience all aspects of a source
domain in order to textually map its characteristics onto a target domain. Through
repetitive exposure to the various conventionalized statements derived from the
TROUBLE IS A CONTAINER metaphor, that would simply be how a child comes to think
– and talk – about trouble or other situations in general.
Given this observation, it is important to acknowledge that simply using
conventional language does not necessarily translate to an effective understanding or
interpretation of metaphor (Cameron Science 676). In fact, children who are
unacquainted with one of the two domains used in metaphor may misinterpret the
intended purpose of the metaphor. Therefore, it should not be assumed that children
will always exhibit a correct interpretation of conceptual metaphors, even in colloquial
language. However, Cameron observes:
Children’s capacity with metaphor develops simultaneously with their
developing knowledge base, and with their developing linguistic and
socio-linguistic capacities. Children move from seeing all metaphorical
language as ‘strange’ language to differentiating between conventional
idiom and creative use of metaphor (Pollio & Pickens, 1980). (Discourse
50)
As a child gains more experience in the world around them, their knowledge refines, as
does the repertoire of conventional metaphors available to them (Cameron Discourse
54).
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Literature selection and analysis
I selected 13 preschool narrative picture books to analyze for my literature
study. The books I compiled were selected based on my personal exposure to popular
children’s books and suggested reading material from educational websites like
teachersfirst.com and commonsensemedia.com. I incorporated both contemporary
and classic selections, with an emphasis on popular/award-winning texts.
My literature analysis began with a thorough reading of each book. I then
noted the specific expressions where I thought metaphor might be present. Guided by
my study of Lakoff and Johnson and my own schooling as a student of language, I
determined if the metaphoric expressions were more explicit and literary in function,
or if they were implicit and possibly derived from a conceptual framework.
Explicit/literary expressions were categorized as such, and implicit expressions were
placed into one of three sub-categories, based on Lakoff and Johnson’s model:
structural metaphor, orientational metaphor, or ontological metaphor. Any
expression that was not clearly identified was marked as undetermined. Because
context is important for determining metaphor, I also made a note of any
textual/illustrated factors that might contribute to understanding the metaphor. The
notes will be addressed in the results/discussion section of my thesis.

Beyer 19

Results
The following table demonstrates my results:
Explicit/Literary expressions
Implicit expressions
Structural expressions
Ontological expressions
Orientational expression
Undetermined
Total:

32

23%

4
70
22
10

3%
51%
16%
7%

138

100%

Analysis and discussion
Explicit/literary expressions
The explicit/literary metaphors identified in my literature selection all fall under
the traditional guise of metaphor: they link two different objects in ways that
encourage a creative or imaginative perspective. Most of these metaphors were fairly
simple; there was no significant elaboration within the text (as a lengthy poem might
elaborate a single metaphor), and all of the metaphors had either explicit textual cues
such as “like” or significant textual or visual context to aid the reader.
By far, personification of animals is one of the most common types of explicit
metaphors in the children’s books I studied. Of the 13 books I read, 10 utilized
personification of animals. The stories assume this is “normal” – it’s not shocking or
surprising when animals talk together or even when a person talks to an animal. Don
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Freeman’s story Corduroy, for example, relays a perfectly “normal” conversation
between a young girl and her teddy bear near the end of the book. Likewise, Laura
Joffe Numeroff’s If You Give a Mouse a Cookie implies a lengthy conversation between
a human-like mouse and a little boy. Personifying animals might be a good way to help
introduce personification to children because animals share many common features
with humans. It is easy to imagine an animal talking, for example, because they have
mouths. These books demonstrate that those features can be elaborated to include
more human-like qualities, such as the human-like emotions expressed by the pigeon
in Mo Willem’s Don’t Let the Pigeon Drive the Bus.
Occasionally, there were instances of personification that were a little more
elaborate. In Pfister’s The Rainbow Fish, an octopus remarks, “the waves have told me
your story” (14). Though certainly understandable, this specific personification is a
little more creative, simply because waves do not have physical mouths. Likewise, the
train engines in Piper’s The Little Engine that Could would not usually be thought of as
having human-like qualities. The illustrations, however, help develop their
personification by including facial features such as eyes, mouths, and noses on the
engines. By adding these features, the illustrator has provided visual context that
helps children comprehend the personification metaphor more easily.
Other explicit expressions usually functioned as descriptions of places or things.
In Corduroy, a personified teddy bear approaches a department store escalator and
thinks “could this be a mountain?” (Freeman 13). The little boy in The Snowy Day
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makes a similar observation about a large pile of snow: “he pretended he was a
mountain-climber. He climbed up a great big tall mountain of snow” (22). In both
these cases, the characters are projecting what they know about mountains (big,
sloping, climbable) onto the structures before them, even though the structures they
encounter are not literally mountains.
Implicit expressions
Implicit metaphoric expressions within my selected literature accounted for
70% of the total expressions identified, demonstrating a strong metaphoric tendency
in the English language. Unlike the explicit/literary expressions, these expressions
were implicit, which assumes the reader has the necessary knowledge to deduce
meaningful connections for themselves. Because of this assumption, most of the
expressions have very little elaboration or contextual support, with a few exceptions.
Expressions regarding time were among the most common kinds of implicit
metaphor represented in my selected books. Lakoff and Johnson point out that in
English, TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, conceptually-speaking (42). This
conceptualization is consistent with a number of different expressions I identified:
“day after day” (Freeman 5), “back over a year” (Sendak 30), “ten days passed quickly
by” (Bemelmans 28), and “the next morning” (30), just to name a few.
Occasionally, however, the TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT metaphor allowed for a
not-quite-conventional use of creative language, as Maurice Sendak demonstrates in
his award-winning book Where the Wild Things Are. In his book, Sendak describes
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time using the expression “*the little boy sailed+ in and out of weeks” (12, 30).
Conceptually, this expression is consistent with TIME IS AN OBJECT. Because we have
this understanding, Sendak can get a little more creative, where “weeks” actually
become containers, as demonstrated by the use of the prepositions “in” and “out”.
The primary difference between Sendak’s expression and our common
conceptualization of time is that it is the little boy who is moving, and the weeks (or
time) are stationary. Sendak deviates from our normal conceptualization of time just
enough to spark our attention, but not enough to make it conceptually incoherent.
Another common textual feature I noticed was the use of verb + preposition
constructions. In an effort to identify possible orientational metaphors, I recorded
every instance of orientational markers such as “up”, “down”, “front”, “back”, etc.
Here are a few of combinations I found, most of them occurring more than once:
“wake up”, “come on”, “be/go/come back”, “end up”, “fix up”, “eat up”, “hang up”,
“gave up”, “sat down”, “pass by”, “come over”, “shut up”, “get out”, and “pick up”.
Sometimes, these seem to be literal, like “he’ll hang up his drawing *on the
refrigerator]” (Numeroff), where the picture is literally up above the character’s head,
as demonstrated by the accompanying illustration. Other literal expressions might be
“sit down,” “stand up” etc., where the character is literally obligated to physically
move in a manner consistent with those descriptions. But a phrase like “we picked up
my dad at his office” (Viorst 22) doesn’t mean the dad was literally lifted up off the
ground; in this instance, it means that he got a ride home from work. Other examples
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are “give up,” “shut up” or “eat up”, where the orientational preposition “up” does not
indicate a concrete physical movement in that direction. Even if every verb +
preposition combination is not metaphorical, the sheer abundance of them reinforces
a strong tendency to spatially organize our conceptual system in terms of up, down,
forward, backward, etc. Clearly, the language used in these children’s books helps
establish this premise, which then allows for the construction of ontological
metaphors.
Often, orientational and ontological expressions appear to overlap. This may
occur because we have difficulty orienting something until it has been bound by
physical surface area, which implies an ontological relationship. Statements regarding
time are especially prone to crossing both these domains simultaneously. For
example, a statement like “the little blue fish was back” (Pfister 19) seems to entail
two different metaphors working together. The word “back” automatically brings to
mind an orientational relationship where something is either physically at your back or
behind you. That “something”, in this instance, was a past event, where the little blue
fish had encountered the Rainbow fish previously and is now having another similar
encounter. According to Lakoff and Johnson, EVENTS ARE CONTAINERS, which allows
us to conceive of the first encounter as an object. Because TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT,
and the first encounter has “passed by”, that encounter is now conceptually “behind”
us, allowing us to establish the orientational relationship “back” (or “behind”). This
tendency to establish ontological relationships before orientational relationships might
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help explain why ontological metaphors occurred more than three times as often as
orientational metaphors in my analysis.
Ontological and structural metaphors also appear to overlap. I first noticed this
when reading Metaphors We Live By, when Lakoff and Johnson discuss the ontological
metaphor THE MIND IS AN ENTITY (27). They acknowledge that this conceptual
framework can be elaborated to include THE MIND IS A MACHINE (27), at which point
the initial ontological metaphor appears to have transformed into a structural
metaphor. This may be why I identified fewer structural metaphors and an abundance
of ontological metaphors. Saying something is a thing is much easier than specifying
what kind of thing it is; where exactly that distinction comes is a little unclear. For
example, in The Mitten, Jan Brett writes, “*the other animals+ gave the fox lots of
room”. “Room” in this context is being characterized two ways: once by the verb
“gave,” which indicates a metaphorical understanding that ROOM IS AN OBJECT; and
again by “lots of”, which indicates that “room” is also a quantifiable object – it has
physical dimensions which can be compared spatially to other objects. In addition, as
developed throughout the text and accompanying illustrations, “room” in this context
is a highly desirable yet limited object, much the same way we would think of money.
So, “room” as an object (an ontological metaphor) has become ROOM IS A LIMITED
RESOURCE, which more closely resembles a structural metaphor.
Unlike literary metaphors, conceptual metaphoric expressions have very little
textual/illustrated context to assist with understanding. This may be because
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conceptual metaphors are assumed to be understood, rather than developed like
literary metaphors. One exception to this might be demonstrated in Sam McBratney’s
Guess How Much I Love You. This entire book is built on the conceptual metaphor that
LOVE IS AN OBJECT, specifically an object that is bound by measurable surface area.
This metaphor is “shown” using both text and pictures. In the story, Little Nutbrown
Hare remarks “I love you as high as I can hop” (19), which is paired with an illustration
of him frozen in mid air, both feet high off the ground. The idea being developed is
that space between Little Nutbrown Hare’s feet and the ground could be measured,
and that distance is correlated with the size of his love for his father. In addition, this
picture perfectly illustrates the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP, where Little
Nutbrown Hare’s upward physical movement metaphorically corresponds with how
much he loves his father – the higher he can hop, the greater his love. A back and
forth banter is developed between father and son, where each hare thinks of greater
and greater distances to describe their love. This book is an excellent illustration of
how conceptual metaphors help us talk about more abstract concepts like emotions
and love.
One of the most confusing subjects I encountered in my analysis was
expressions regarding bed or bedtime. Nine of the 13 books had some instance of
sleeping or “bed time” somewhere in the story. Some of the expressions I recorded
are: “he’ll crawl in [the bed+” (Numeroff 13), “*he got] into his bed of leaves”
(McBratney 28), “before he got into bed” (Keats 28), “he crawled into bed” (Rey 28), “I
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got out of bed” (Viorst 3), and “I went to bed” (Viorst 28). Most of these expressions
seem pretty straight-forward and literal. But prepositions like “into”, “in”, and “out”
do not accurately convey our special relationship with a bed. As humans, we can be
on a bed, but not literally inside of it. However, these prepositions are consistent with
how we would talk about a container. One can literally go in and out of a container, as
well as get into it. It makes more sense linguistically if “bed” in these instances were
conceptualized as a container. Also notice how most of these expressions lack articles.
This tendency seems to indicate that “bed” as a concept does not just refer to a
physical object. The effect of “go to bed” versus “go to the bed” indicates “bed” is an
occasion or event. Because EVENTS ARE CONTAINERS metaphorically-speaking, this
reasoning is consistent with the language used to talk about beds and bedtime.

Conclusion
My results indicate a strong presence of metaphoric expressions in children’s
literature, especially implicit expressions that derive from a metaphoric conceptual
system. By nature of being children’s books and as evidenced through the text itself,
the majority of these expressions use conventional, every-day language. They are not
linguistically complex, and they are meant to be readily understood by the reader.
These findings are consistent with the theory presented by Lakoff and Johnson in their
book, Metaphors We Live By.
In consideration of these results, I have presented a few of the most common
implicit and explicit metaphoric features of my selected literature, such as the
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personification of animals, expressions regarding time, expressions regarding bed, verb
+ preposition constructions, and the overlap between ontological metaphors and
structural or orientational metaphors. These results highlight the extent to which
metaphor works its way into colloquial language, even language geared for young
audiences.
Through this thesis, I have endeavored to bring to light an otherwise
unconscious facet of our every-day interaction with one another. Metaphoric
expressions – whether intentional or derived from a metaphoric conceptual system –
are essential to the way we talk and act upon abstract concepts. Metaphor is so
inherent, if fact, that one may have difficulty thinking and communicating clearly
without it. Once realized, the subtlety of metaphor becomes a fascinating feature of
language, and offers us a glimpse into how we think and organize thought.

Beyer 28

Bibliography
Bemelmans, Ludwig. Madeline. New York: Puffin Books, 1939.
Brett, Jan. The Mitten. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1989.
Cameron, Lynne. "Discourse Context and the Development of Metaphor in Children."
Current Issues in Language and Society (1996): 49-64.
—. "Metaphors in the Learning of Science: a discourse focus." British Educational
Reseach Journal 28.5 (2002): 673-688.
Epstein, Ruth L. and Peter J. Gamlin. "Young Children's Comprehension of Simple and
Complex Metaphors Presented in Pictures and Words." Metaphor and Symbolic
Activity 9.3 (1994): 179-191.
Freeman, Don. Corduroy. New York: Puffin Books, 1968.
Johnson, Janice. "Developmental Versus Language-Based Factors in Metaphor
Interpretation." Journal of Educational Psychology 83.4 (1991): 470-483.
Keats, Ezra Jack. The Snowy Day. New York: Viking, 1962.
Lakoff, George. "A Figure of Thought." METAPHOR AND SYMPOLIC ACTIVITY 1.3 (1986):
215-226.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1980.
McBratney, Sam. Guess How Much I Love You. Boston: Walker Books, 1995.
Numeroff, Laura Joffe. If You Give a Mouse a Cookie. New York: HarperCollins
Children's Books, 1985.
Ortony, Andrew et al. "Cultural and Instructional influences on Figurative Language
Comprehension by Inner City Children." Research in the Teaching of English
19.1 (1985): 25-36.
Pfister, Marcus. The Rainbow Fish. New York: North-South Books Inc., 1992.
Piper, Watty. The Little Engine That Could. New York: Philomel Books, 2005.

Beyer 29

Potter, Beatrix. The Tale of Peter Rabbit. San Francisco: Chronicle Books LLC, 2005.
Pramling, Niklas and Ingrid Pramling Samuelsson. "The prosaics of figurative langauge
in preschool: some observations and suggestions for research." Early Childhood
Development and Care 177.6&7 (2007): 707-717.
Rey, H. A. Curious George. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.
Reynolds, Ralph E. and Andrew Ortony. "Some Issues in the Measurement of Children's
Comprehension of Metaphorical Language." Child Development 51.4 (1980):
1110-1119.
Sendak, Maurice. Where the Wild Things Are. New York: HarperCollins Publishers,
1963.
Siltanen, Susan A. "Effects of Explicitness on Children's Metaphor Comprehension."
Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 5.1 (1990): 1-20.
Siltanen, Susan. "Effects of Explicitness on Children's Metaphor Comprehension."
Metaphor & Symbolic Activity 5.1 (1990): 1-20.
Viorst, Judith. Alexander and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day. New York:
Atheneum Books for Young Readers, 2009.
Vosniadou, Stella et al. "Sources of Difficulty in the Young Child's Understanding of
Metaphorical Language." Child Development 55.4 (1984): 1588-1606.
Willems, Mo. Don't Let the Pigeon Drove the Bus. New York: Hyperion Books for
Children, 2003.

